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1This paper is the text of a talk given in The Hague in 1977 and was originally
published in Spinoza Herdact: 1677–21 Feb 1977, Amsterdam: Algemeen 
Netherlands. Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte. am sure for all of us gathered here, that it is great to be able to 
ontemplate Spinoza in the town he lived in for so long and where he 
ied 300 years ago today. It is natural to imagine how many others 
ould cherish such a moment at this place, but who cannot be here for 
he same reason that Spinoza is not here. I think of Spinoza’s good old 
riends and his young friend Georg Hermann Schuller, who, rather than 
odewijk Meyer, is now considered to have been the person who was 
ith Spinoza at the moment he passed away. Of the older friends, I 
ould like to mention to Jarig Jelles, De Vries, and his landlord Van 
er Spyck. We would all of us here like, I suppose, to call ourselves 
riends of Spinoza, but these people were fortunate in being able to live 
ut their friendship. Spinoza’s two contemporary biographers, Jean 
aximalian Lucas and Colerus, should also be mentioned. 
 
he anniversary of his death is perhaps a sad occasion for sending these 
ontemporaries of Spinoza a greeting. But everything we know about 
pinoza supports the belief that he retained his equanimity to the very 
ast. He calls upon us to contemplate death with calmness, if at all. His 
ying was not of the dramatic kind suffered by another great, but more 
essimistic investigator of the human predicament, Sigmund Freud. 
My world,” he said in his last days, “is an island of pain in a sea of 
ndifference.” 
 
hinking of who else would have liked to be here, not in honour of 
pinoza, since he neither needed nor sought honours, but in terms of 
armth and friendship first and foremost come to mind the many 
nonymous people who have found in Spinoza a source of inspiration 
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and of increased trust in themselves, in others, and in the laws of 
Nature. But let us also recall the astonishing diversity and number of 
well known spirits who could be mentioned. I think of Goethe, Herder, 
Schelling, Lessing, Hegel, and many scientists and rationalists from 
Spinoza’s own day to Albert Einstein in the twentieth century. I would 
like to mention friends of Spinoza in the Soviet Union, Alexander 
Deborin and others. 
  
As I recall the work done for Spinoza in the form of editing and the 
critical study of texts and the patient, loving investigation of sources, 
the names of Jan Rieuwertsz, Carl Gebhardt, Dunin-Borkowski, 
Freudenthal Boscherini, come to my mind. Many others could be 
mentioned. 
 
II 
There is a special reason why the expression “friends of Spinoza” can 
be used without raising any qualms as to exactly who they are. After the 
death of great philosophers there are usually heated controversies about 
who are the real inheritors of their ideas. For centuries after the death of 
Socrates, school fought school, each of them detesting the other. 
Hegelians split into right and left. Nothing of the kind has so far 
happened since the death of Spinoza. There are many reasons for this, 
some rather interesting. But the main thing for all of us at this moment 
is the ability to form a community of friends of Spinoza and each other 
despite all the differences in our philosophies. I presume we do not 
belong to sects quarrelling with each other unduly about how to 
interpret “the master.” Whatever the disagreements, something 
emanating both from the personality of Spinoza and from his Ethics sub 
specie aeternitatis may well contribute to this lack of fanaticism. 
 
III 
But let me not continue in a spirit that Spinoza might deem slightly 
sentimental. Let me mention one of the reasons why the system of 
Spinoza cannot easily be accepted as a whole, or even in part, by 
Western academic philosophers. The Ethics contains several hundred 
proofs, and the analytically minded report, generally with regret, that 
according to modern formal logic, the conclusions practically never 
follow from the premises. There also seems to be a number of logical 
inconsistencies. 
  
It is a special pleasure for me to report that the status of the proofs is 
likely to improve this memorable year. A systematic formal logical 
reconstruction of the whole of Part One of the Ethics will soon be 
published. What are lacking, according to the author, are additional 
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premises mostly of a rather trivial kind. Only a very small proportion of 
the 161 additional premises are open to doubt as to whether Spinoza 
himself would accept them. Interestingly enough some of these are 
introduced to bolster Spinoza’s version of the ontological proof for the 
existence of God. As I see it, it would not matter much whether or not 
this proof were included in the system. 
  
The reconstruction using calculus of propositions and predicates results 
in a logically consistent version of Part One of the Ethics. I do not know 
how much importance, if any, you attach to this result. Spinoza will 
scarcely win many more friends because of such a cold victory. But it 
could lead to painstaking studies of Spinoza being increasingly taken up 
in philosophical departments where formal clarity and consistency are 
demanded and cherished more than relevance to life. Anyhow, some of 
the so-called proofs in the Ethics are so loosely formulated that Spinoza 
could not possibly have pretended quod erat demonstrandum to be 
formal proof. 
 
IV 
The question of why there are no competing schools of Spinozism has 
led me astray. Instead, let us consider friendship. Clearly Spinoza’s 
intellectual sobriety favours friendship rather than worship. I wish to 
pursue the question for a moment of what his system might mean to 
friendship. Is it not so that Spinoza both through his person and in his 
system advises against strong passions, intensive emotions, or affects. 
Does he favour calmness? Does he consider friendship to be something 
calm? The last question may be answered tentatively in the positive. 
But there remains the question of whether calmness implies weakness. I 
think the opposite of strong affects is weak affects, not calmness in the 
important sense of equanimity. In what follows I shall argue that 
Spinoza is in favour of strong affects as a more powerful way to 
increase one’s level of freedom and understanding, rather than weak 
affects. But even the strongest affect should not disturb one’s basic 
equanimity, a balance characterizing the integrated personality. 
  
But before I take up that argument, let us see what place Spinoza 
accords friendship in his social philosophy. 
  
“The free man is intent upon joining other free men in friendship,” says 
Spinoza in the proof to Proposition 70, Part 4 of the Ethics. In the proof 
of Proposition 71, he says that free men are united by the closest bond 
of friendship and seek to benefit each other with the same eagerness of 
love. According to the first note to Proposition 37, free men joined in 
friendship are led by reason; they live under the guidance of reason, ex 
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ductu rationis. The eagerness of love is therefore not incompatible with 
such a life. Spinoza’s deep and colourful concept of reason has little to 
do with the contemporary narrow intellectualistic notion. 
  
Today it is difficult to avoid the question: does Spinoza, by free men, 
mean the same as free males? Does he exclude women? I shall not try 
to argue, but only mention that my conclusion, based on the texts of 
Spinoza, is that the community of free men envisaged by him includes 
women. He takes for granted that men and women can join in 
friendship. Incidentally, if Freudenthal is right in his biography of 
Spinoza, Spinoza had female friends. 
  
In the note to Proposition 59 in Part 3, Spinoza accords great conceptual 
weight to “friendship”: he defines the basic “generosity” through the 
notion of friendship, not the other way round. Generosity is an intimate 
synthesis of cupidity and drive, led by reason to help in establishing 
bonds of friendship. According to the first note to Proposition 37 in Part 
4, the definition of virtue, in the sense of the Latin virtus, presupposes 
the concept of friendship. Virtue is indirectly defined in part by means 
of the concept of friendship.  
 
V 
In the light of the foregoing, one may conclude that friendship is the 
basic social relation between members of the community of free men. 
But, says Spinoza, our capacity is limited and we cannot be friends of 
all inhabitants of a country. This implies that all groups of 
underprivileged, including the very poor, cannot be helped effectively 
merely through friendship. The help must be organized by the 
community, that is, by a kind of central administration. Spinoza rejects 
the modern anarchism of small groups of friends in opposition to the 
establishment. He sees the necessity of large societies with central 
administration. The friendly crisscross relations between members must 
develop within the larger framework. 
 
So much for warm friendship. I shall now permit myself to go into a 
wider problem concerning both Spinoza as a man and his system. 
  
Is the stress on friendship and mutual help in understanding his famous 
appeal to control and coerce the emotions an indicator of a general so-
called stoic doctrine of fighting the strength of emotions? I shall try to 
argue or even “prove,” in the sense of Spinoza, that, on the contrary, he 
implies that rapid gain in power, joy, understanding, and freedom 
presuppose strong affects. 
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Let us take as point of departure definition 3 of Part 3 and proceed very 
slowly and carefully: 
  
By affects, affectus, I understand the affections, of a body by which 
the power of acting of that body is increased, diminished, helped, or 
hindered, together with the ideas of these affections. 
  
For our limited purpose the definition can be somewhat simplified 
without loss. 
  
One of the affects is intellectual, or better, understanding, love of God. 
A state of such love is a state of a body experiencing love, but it is 
certainly also a state of the mind. This is in accordance with Spinoza’s 
general view of mind and body acting together. 
  
In 3P12 and 3P12Dem both the mind’s and body’s power of action are 
mentioned. What is said strongly supports that the first power only 
increased (or decreases) if the second does, and vice versa. There is no 
affect which increases only the power of action of the body. From 3P11 
it is seen that the power of action of the mind is the same as its power to 
think. I shall assume that this is the same as the power to understand. 
  
At the time of Spinoza, psychology did not postulate any marked 
distinction between cognitive and conative functions of the mind and 
body. Unhappily, there is still today a tendency in philosophy to adhere 
to such a marked distinction and, accordingly, use a very narrowly 
cognitive consensus of combined cognitive and conative import. If this 
is not remembered, the above theorems and concepts of Spinoza seem 
to confuse emotion, action, and understanding. On the contrary, they 
clarify issues very much in the spirit of the best in modern psychology 
and psychiatry. 
  
According to the above, we need not in the definition separate body 
from mind or idea. The definition may therefore be thus reformulated: 
  
By affects I understand an affection (state) by which the power of 
action is increased or decreased. 
  
Spinoza uses many complex power-terms: power of acting, conceiving, 
thinking, understanding, reasoning, imagining and existing. 
Conceptually, these powers are not identical, but in terms of denotation 
most of them are. The power gained through intellectual love of God is 
surely a power of acting and understanding, not only of acting in a 
narrow sense. Similar complex power gains or losses adhere to other 
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affects. Thus we may undertake one more step of simplification of the 
definition:  
 
By an affect I understand a state or process by which power is 
increased or decreased. 
 
VI 
Already this definition of affect should protect us from the view that 
Spinoza warns against strong affects in general. 
  
In the note to Proposition 11, Part 3 Spinoza says: 
  
In what follows I understand by joy, laelitia, the affect, passio, through 
which the mind passes to greater perfection. By sorrow, tristitia, on the other 
hand, I understand the affect through which it passes to smaller perfection. 
  
These definitions are repeated in his list of definitions, but with a 
remarkable difference. Spinoza seems to identify joy or sorrow with the 
change in level of perfection: “Joy is man’s transition from a smaller to 
greater perfection.” At any rate we are compelled to assume an internal 
relation between the transition and the affects, not a mere instrumental 
or other kind of external relation. Thus, we should avoid the expression 
that the transition is associated with joy, or produces joy. 
  
The change of level of power and the change of level of perfection are 
conceptually or intentionally distinguishable, but scarcely on the level 
of corresponding change of the other. Thus change of level of the one 
implies mutually corresponding change of the other. Thus, by an affect, 
Spinoza also understands a state by which perfection increases or 
decreases. 
  
One may ask whether man may pass to greater power or perfection 
through any of other processes than through certain kinds of joy. There 
is in the Ethics no mention of an alternative. Love is defined as a joy, 
therefore the understanding love of God is no exception. An increase of 
understanding of this kind occurs through joy, that is, with joy as 
internal property. The term “understanding love” is a new translation of 
amor intellectualis. The old translation “intellectual love” is misleading 
because the modern terms “intellectual” and “intellect” are very narrow 
and more or less opposed to “emotional” and “motivational” and 
“affective.” The adjective intellectualis derives from the verb 
intelligere, “to understand” taken in a wide sense not opposed to 
affectivity. 
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All affects either arise (oriri) from joy, sorrow, or desire, according to 
Spinoza. We may therefore be confident that basic properties that hold 
with regards to the three will hold for the rest. 
  
Let us contemplate what Spinoza says in the note to the second 
corollary to Proposition 45 in Part 4: 
 
The greater the joy wherewith we are affected, the greater the perfection 
whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we partake of the divine 
nature.1
By greatness of an affect I propose to understand intensity, richness and 
deepness. The last two dimensions measure how a great part of our 
personality is affected and how deep the affect penetrates into the hidden 
parts of it. 
The expression “passing to a greater perfection” I understand to 
indicate a gain in level of perfection, the latter term being interpreted in 
close regard to the Latin perfacere, and measuring primarily how far we 
arrive at being a whole, an integrated person. The more perfected is the 
more completed and accomplished. We need not go outside ourselves, 
but just be ourselves, wholly and honestly—preserving what Spinoza 
calls our essence. 
 
Going back to our consideration of affects as power generators, we may 
introduce a new proportionality theorem:  
 
The greater the active affect, the greater the gain in power.  
 
Since the road to greater freedom and greater perfection is the same, we 
may also assert the greater the active affect, the greater the gain in level 
of freedom. 
 
Lastly, considering the internal relation between gain in freedom and 
power, and gain in understanding, we arrive at the important 
proportionality of greatness of active affect and gain in understanding. 
The gain does not imply accumulation of knowledge. Like the joy 
inherent in understanding, the gain in understanding itself may be said 
to proceed along three dimensions, intensity, richness, and depth. The 
gain is primarily in quality, not quantity. 
 
But what if we are affected with a strong passive affect, a passion in the 
negative usage of the word? We should, according to Spinoza, as much 
as possible, get to know it and make it superbly conscious in all its 
ramifications. As we succeed, we are already on the way to turning the 
passive affect into an active one. Moreover, the transformation will not 
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decrease the strength of our affects. The victory over the passivity 
depends on the strength of the activeness that can be turned into the 
battle. The influence of the relative strength of affects is also treated in 
3P37 Dem.  
 
The greater the joy, the greater the gain of power.  
 
Somebody who avoids sorrow, but thereby also avoids great joys, gains 
less in power, understanding, and freedom than one who seeks great 
joys. But, some would think, does not the search for excruciatingly 
intense, rich, and deep joys invite disaster? No, Spinoza would answer. 
The nature of human beings strengthens joys that are relatively 
independent of the common order of things, that is, what happens in the 
world around us—more or less unpredictable events. The greatest joys 
will be experiences in the greatest acts of understanding, and the more 
we realize this the more we desire. Thus we are led from Part 3 through 
4, to Part 5 with the theory of the understanding love of God or Nature 
with a capital N. 
 
One may interpret this active love to be a kind of mystic contemplation, 
in loneliness or with carefully selected friends, but one may also 
interpret it ultimately to embrace helpful social and political action. The 
Eastern parallel is in Mahayana Buddhism, in which, to reach the 
highest levels of freedom, an individual must work to free all others. 
 
The theoretical problems of active versus passive lead to the 
investigation of Spinoza’s frequent reflections about parts of the body. 
The quality and therefore activeness of an affect seems to be roughly 
proportional to how many parts of the body it relates to. The short proof 
Proposition 16, Part 5, opens with the assertion that love of God is 
joined, junctus, to all the affections of the body, and cherished fovetur, 
by all.2 But let us see how the part/whole distinction works within 
Spinoza’s theory of the dynamics of emotion. 
 
VII 
The use of the whole/part distinction in relation to quality of emotions 
is a powerful tool for Spinoza and is in the very best relations to 
modern psychology of the integrated person. The integrated person is 
characterized by functioning always as a whole however strong the 
emotions stirring mind and body. 
  
The whole/part distinction applied to joy furnishes the important 
distinction between joy engaging all parts of the body equally, which 
therefore does not prevent joys connected with other parts to make 
Festschrift Section, Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 119
themselves dominate and subdue joys connected with other parts. The 
former, which is always good and can never be excessive, never too 
strong, Spinoza calls hilaritas. The latter, which can be excessive and 
too strong, he calls titillatio. Both are species of laetitia. 
  
Whereas joy, laelitia, is a positive kind of affect, that is, increases 
power, sorrow, tristitia, is a negative kind. It decreases power. 
  
For my present argument, the important point is that positive emotions 
which engage the total personality, that is, all parts of it, increase 
power, and, the stronger it is, the greater the increase, the weaker, the 
smaller the increase. 
  
If, as is likely to be Spinoza’s opinion, we start with a very low level of 
power, understanding, and freedom, being slaves of passions in the 
sense of negative emotion, the way towards high levels is long. How far 
we come will depend on two characteristics of our emotions, the 
strength of our positive and the weakness of our negative emotions. As 
the negative emotions can only be overcome by other emotions, that is, 
the positive ones, we may conclude that the stronger our active 
emotions, the faster we reach higher levels, and the further in that 
direction we are able to proceed. 
  
Freedom and understanding being proportional to power, the strength 
of active emotions determines how far we can reach in these respects 
also.  
  
In the light of these results it is highly misleading to say that Spinoza 
favours moderately strong emotions, or that he favours quiet or modest 
ones. Moderation in terms of harmonious development of all emotional 
resources is implied in the whole/part conception. But this does not 
relate to strength. 
  
Applied to life styles, I think Spinoza would favour an active life in the 
sense of a life likely to lead a person into crucial situations for the 
development of his life or her emotions. Kinds of situations would have 
to be sought in which strong active emotions are likely to arise. A 
person who chooses a life that protects him from the impact of 
emotional situations, protects not only from the negative, but also from 
the positive emotions. This means that the person will show stagnation 
in his or her development towards higher levels of power, 
understanding, and freedom. 
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There are of course great risks involved in seeking out the jobs and 
circumstances likely to elicit strong emotion. For example, it may turn 
out that we overrate our capacity for positive response with generosity. 
To our consternation we may react with hatred, greed, or what not. The 
risks to be taken will therefore have to be calculated risks. But I cannot 
see any other solution to the problem of how to reach a high level than 
by testing one self. 
 
VIII 
One sometimes gets the impression that authors expressing their warm 
feelings for Spinoza perhaps unconsciously take him to have been 
meek-hearted, soft, mild as milk and water, tame, gentle as a lamb, 
unassuming. In a situation of some importance for him, whether 
religious or practical, this way of seeing and feeling him is misguided. 
And even if external circumstances, the hatred of orthodox Jews of his 
day and his bad health, restricted his own activity, one must not think 
that his message to the readers of his works is to live as he himself did. 
  
Even worse is what is sometimes assumed to be his advice against 
passions: That we should aspire to be unruffled, poised, sedate, cool as 
a cucumber and quiet as a mouse. I am of course not the first to object 
to this bloodless image of Spinoza. In a Festschrift for Spinoza in 1932, 
Jakob Klatzkin stressed his passionate nature. But the greatest passion 
was the Vernungtsliebe (love of rationality). Well said, but ratio is that 
of his time and culture, not of our affluent consumer societies. 
 
IX 
I have permitted myself to go into some professional details (on the 
strength of emotions) because I think that even in a commemoration 
lecture in a place like this, cool analysis is appropriate when Spinoza is 
the object of our commemoration. He looked for clarification of truth 
and was enthusiastic whenever he thought he had found a new friend 
with whom to discuss the most difficult questions. He ends his first 
letter to Blyenbergh saying: 
  
This, sir, is all that I can now submit in answer to your question . . . But if 
you still find difficulty, then I beg you to let me know, in order to see if I can 
remove it . . . as long as you do not consider yourself satisfied, I would like 
nothing better than to know the reasons thereof, so that truth may dawn at 
last. 
 
It is this inheritance that should animate us, we who have the temerity 
to call ourselves friends of Spinoza. 
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In 1927 and 1932 there were commemorations of Spinoza all over the 
world. Since then things have happened that have made Spinoza more 
up to date than ever. The rise and fall of the Third Reich with all its 
fanaticism and atrocities made many feel Spinoza as the ultimate 
guiding star and source of consolation. The contrast between his ideas 
and those of fascism could not be greater. 
  
Among the other things that have happened, I have personal reasons to 
mention the birth of the great and deep ecology movement about 15 
years ago. At the philosophical center of this discussion we have the 
question of industrial man’s imperfect concept and relation to nature. 
Spinoza denied ever having identified God with the debased notion of a 
certain mass or with corporeal matter (Letter 73). The Nature (with a 
capital N) that Spinoza identified with God has the main features 
needed in the deep ecology movement. This, and an astonishing variety 
of related features, makes Spinoza’s philosophy a valuable frame for 
ecological thinking. 
  
Ending up with the theme for friendship, I would like to stress the 
ecological concept of symbiosis as opposed to cutthroat competition: 
both in Spinoza, and in the thinking of the field ecologist, there is 
respect for the extreme diversity of beings capable of living together in 
an intricate web of relations. It is the special responsibility and source 
of happiness for humans that we can bring this into light of 
consciousness and contemplate and cultivate the unity in diversity. 
  
In short, this 300 anniversary commemoration will not be the last. 
Spinoza seems to be an inexhaustible source. We certainly will not be 
able to partake, let us say, in the next 300 commemorations, and 
perhaps we shall regret this. We appreciate and enjoy the thought that 
our friend, the great philosopher, has a vast future in which to help and 
influence our confused species towards higher levels of joy and 
perfection. 
Notes 
                                                 
1 The first part of the quotation asserts a proportionality between the greatness of an 
affect and the gain in perfection. Joy in the sense of laetitia is not always something 
wholly good; it is not always an active affect. In the passage quoted we must think of 
an active joy. Or else, we must take increases of perfectio to be as ambivalent as 
laetitia- sometimes a good thing, sometimes a bad.
 
2 The term jungere, incidentally, corresponds to the Sanskrit yuj, perfectum 
participium, yukta, and well known in the form yoga. The Spinoza scholar Jon 
Wetlesen has related the proof quoted to certain methods of Buddhist meditation, 
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based on the intense awareness of the body, that is, on getting a clear and distant 
awareness of the affections and affects of the body. 
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